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Interest Groups or Incentives: The Political Economy of Fiscal Decay 
 
Abstract 
One view is that concessions demanded by and granted to interests groups are 
responsible for steady fiscal decline, and delay in reforms. We argue that negative 
supply shocks combined with the political objective of protecting the poor can build 
in incentives leading to these results. Pricing rules for government services, generated 
in such circumstances, would be equivalent to a fixed price contract that left the 
government with negative rent. A decline in investment in and quality of government 
services would follow, since price controls in the presence of cost shocks would lead 
to systematic incentives to lower quality and investment. Tax capacity and the ability 
to reduce poverty in the future would fall. The framework helps to understand the 
Indian experience. Time series based tests of causality support the causal priority of 
positive cost shocks. If it is accepted that incentives, and not only interest groups are 
responsible for fiscal decay, a concerted attempt to rationalize user charges and 
improve quality may be politically feasible.  
 
Key Words: Cost shocks, user charges, political economy, cross-subsidization, 
interest groups, fiscal decay, incentives 
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1 Introduction 
The reforms of the nineties, and the resistance they encountered, have re-kindled 
interest in political economy
1
. Recent literature analyzes the role of strategic 
interaction among interest groups in explaining delay in adopting and successfully 
completing reforms. Concessions given to appease powerful interest groups have been 
seen as responsible for the decay in government finances (Bardhan 1984). We argue 
that the government of a poor populous democracy may choose populist pricing 
policies in the face of cost shocks. But this sets in place incentive mechanisms that 
corrode the ability of the Government to provide essential infrastructure, lower the 
quality of government services, and harm every group in the long run. These 
disincentives are, however, easier to correct than competitive pressure from interest 
groups.   
 
We demonstrate the incentives at work in a stylized theoretical framework, show how 
it applies to the Indian case, and test it with time series data. We model the 
government as contracting out its activities to a large multi-product public service 
provider
2
 (PSP). The Government is democratically elected. Since the poor have the 
largest votes, incumbents want to provide government services at low prices. This 
leads to cross-subsidization both in the provision of specific products and across 
government functions. Maximizing social welfare subject to a budget constraint 
derives optimal cross-subsidization. This is the Ramsey-Boiteux rule. It implies that 
prices should differ from marginal cost but the gap should be inversely proportional to 
elasticities of demand. For example, if the poor buy a good whose elasticity of 
demand is relatively lower, margins charged on it should be relatively higher. The rule 
can take account of other objectives in social welfare such as redistribution and 
correcting incentives under asymmetric information, and has been generalized into the 
theory of optimal non-linear tariffs.  
 
                                                          
1
 Rodrick (1996) offers a survey. Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Drazen (1996) examine the role of 
interest groups in delaying reform, and therefore worsening government finances. 
2
 In India the provision of government services is put under three heads: general administration, 
departmental, and non-departmental enterprises. The latter two charge for their products, while the 
costs of the first have largely to be covered by taxation. All these government agencies can be regarded 
as a PSP. 
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A growing budget deficit implies that the budget constraint has been violated; relative 
prices have not been derived from first principles.  This can happen if user charges on 
goods consumed by the poor are kept frozen after a cost shock. Moreover if, because 
of cross subsidization, the price in any sub-market exceeds cost, or if new technology 
lowers cost or breaks a natural monopoly, competitive entry occurs. Government 
revenues from these sub-sectors fall further. 
 
If the budget is not balanced the PSP is left with negative rent. There are two natural 
extremes in pricing rules that have opposite effects on the incentives of the PSP to 
lower cost or improve quality. The first, a price cap, offers high-powered incentives 
since the residual profit share (rent) lies with the PSP. In the second, rate of return 
regulation, incentives are low powered. The cost of the service is reimbursed and 
profits from improvements do not stay with the PSP, so there is no motivation to 
decrease costs. In designing an incentive scheme there is always a trade-off between 
rent extraction and providing incentives for additional effort. A price cap if low 
enough extracts all rent, but can still motivate a decrease in costs. But it reduces 
incentives to invest and improve quality. Low-powered incentives are required for the 
provision of quality, since costs rise with the latter. Similarly there is a disincentive to 
invest in the presence of price caps because investment costs sunk may be 
expropriated. When the poor form the major vote banks, raising prices of the services 
they consume is an unpopular decision politically. Then if net cost shocks are positive 
over a period, price caps can become low enough to leave the PSP with negative rent.    
 
Indian experience illustrates these theories. Bardhan (1984) had hypothesized that 
powerful vested interests, each getting concessions such as employment, subsidies, 
free loans, and cheap public goods, were responsible for the decay in Indian 
government finances. Farmers, traders, industrialists, bureaucrats, and unionized 
workers each benefited. If this were the whole cause, government consumption as a 
ratio of the Gross Domestic Product should have risen steadily. But it was almost the 
same in the mid-nineties as it was in the mid-seventies. It is true the ratio could have 
fallen, but why should the let up in interest group pressure, that allowed it to remain 
constant, coincide with the period after the oil shocks? The component of current 
expenditure that did rise is interest payments (see, Goyal, 1999). The other feature 
 5 
interest group theories cannot explain is the pervasive decline in the quality of 
government services.   
 
An alternative view of the political forces that impinged on budget making provides a 
better explanation of these stylized facts. The political necessity of populism, in the 
presence of net positive cost shocks, initiated the decay in government finances. Oil 
prices rose and agricultural output fell in the seventies. It was difficult to raise user 
charges for public goods. The result was increasing cross-subsidization, where 
industry and the well off were to pay for provision of services to the poor. This is in 
itself a valid social objective (apart from catering to dominant vote banks). But since 
it violated the budget constraint it built-in incentives for a fall in quality and 
investment. Since capacity constraints soon appeared, poor quality, time delays, and 
controls were used as rationing devices. It became advantageous for the rich to opt out 
of the system. Private alternatives appeared to service them. The government lost 
revenue, and the poor suffered non-monetary costs. A humane society requires cross-
subsidization, but that is viable over the longer term only if the revenue budget is 
balanced and other economic criteria met. The cross-subsidization chosen was 
unsustainable. Interest payments on borrowing made to meet shortfalls in revenue 
began adding on to deficits. Perverse incentives got entrenched when relative prices 
were not allowed to adjust, and harmed the quality of provision of public services and 
the revenue raising capability of the government. Less corroding policies are available 
to protect the poor
3
. Once concessions become the norm, it is difficult for any one 
political party to remove them alone. A change in the status quo is seen as targeting a 
particular group. But as the welfare losses become obvious, a common political 
platform across parties and a critical mass supporting the required restructuring, can 
arise. Or law could implement the changes. 
 
It is difficult to go against powerful vested interests. But if the benefits are only short-
term or strategic, it is possible to educate interest groups. For example, the user 
charges required to improve the revenue deficit will be more acceptable if the adverse 
effects of pricing distortions in the face of cost shocks are recognized. Poor quality is 
                                                          
3
 Goyal (1999) lists some of these. In general they are the policy set that enhance earning power of the 
poor. Transfers should be tightly targeted and eventually give way to a negative income tax. 
 6 
as much a cost to the poor as high prices. There is evidence that the poor are willing to 
pay higher prices for better quality
4
. 
 
Our hypotheses impose a causal ordering on time series of the government budget and 
price variables. Cost shocks, which cause inflation, should raise the revenue deficit, as 
revenues continuously fall short of expenditures. Only if there is automatic 
monetization, would the money supply then rise. If interest groups are able to 
independently wrest concessions from the Government then it is the revenue deficit 
that should raise money supply and inflation. Time series tests we conduct support the 
causal role of cost shocks and incentives mechanisms, in initiating the decay in 
government finances. The tests also imply that although the Indian central bank was 
not formally independent in the period, there was no automatic monetization of the 
revenue deficit. Rather cost shocks raised Government borrowing and interest 
payments.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the provision of two 
kinds of government services and draws out the implications of budget balance and 
cross-subsidization. Section 3 uses the model to examine the effects of a cost shock, 
when prices are administered, on the incentives to invest and provide quality services. 
Section 4 tests the model with Indian data. Section 5 concludes.    
 
2 The Model 
A Public Service Provider (PSP) provides two kinds of service (or goods, 
Rq  and qL) 
of value S for the public. The poor consume qL and the rich qR. The cost function of 
the PSP is 
     C = C (, e, q)              (1) 
Where  is a technological parameter (C > 0), 
           e is its manager's cost-reducing effort (Ce < 0) 
           q  (qR, qL) is the PSP’s  output vector (Cqk > 0) 
                                                          
4
 Farmers are given free or highly subsidized but unreliable electricity in many Indian States. In the 
course of reform farmers have often said they were willing to pay for better quality. It is interesting to 
note that in UP where the quality of supply is very bad farmers were willing to pay, but in MP where 
the supply is better, they were not. In experimental reforms in Rajasthan farmers were willing to pay 
four to five times the usual tariff for assured quality. As an informal targeting and cost saving device 
very poor quality foodgrains are sold in India's public distribution scheme. Many low-income 
households’ prefer to pay more and buy from the free market. An interviewee reported that apart from 
other higher transaction costs, it took too long to clean stones from the ration shop rice.  
 7 
Bold letters denotes vectors. To refer to any of the two goods, subscript k is used. 
Subscripts other than those indexing goods (that is, k, L, and R) denote partial 
derivatives. 
              
We make the accounting convention that the revenue
5
 R(q) (if any) generated by the 
sale of outputs is transferred to the general budget; the government pays the cost of 
production and then pays a net transfer to the PSP. Therefore the PSP would want to 
maximize the latter.  
 
This arrangement can be understood as a contract written between the Government 
and the PSP. The class of linear contracts where the transfer equals a - bC, 0 < b < 1, 
are known as incentive contracts
6
. The power of the incentive scheme is b. A low 
powered cost plus contract occurs if b = 0 since the PSP does not bear any of the cost. 
A high-powered fixed price contract occurs if b = 1, since the government does not 
reimburse any of the costs. The PSP has high incentives to improve efficiency since it 
would retain any cost savings
7
. Clearly, the accounting convention can also be 
understood as the PSP paying for its costs, with the government reimbursing a 
fraction 1 - b of the cost and giving a fee a. 
 
Although  will be relatively lower in the production of qL, we can assume without 
loss of generality that  and e are the same in the production of the two goods, are 
known to the PSP and to the Government. This simple framework will allow us to 
derive optimality conditions and their implications for the relationship between cost 
and prices across the two goods.   
2.1 Model solutions 
Let t denote the net monetary transfer from the Government to the PSP, (.) the 
disutility of effort, then the PSP’s objective function is 
                                                          
5
 Our broad definition of the PSP implies that revenue includes taxes, which are regarded as the price 
of administrative services. 
6
 See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for the general theory of incentive contracts, under asymmetric 
information, in the context of regulation, and Joskow (1998) for applications to developing countries. 
Our treatment follows Laffont and Tirole. 
7
 The contract between the government and the PSP is an artifice to bring out the incentive effects of 
pricing policies following cost shocks. The PSP and the government are identical. Although Dixit 
(1996) examines incentives in government structures, he does not examine effects of pricing 
government services. 
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     U = t - (e)                                                       (2)                    
And its participation constraint is 
     U  0                                                              (3) 
’>0, ”>0,  (0) = 0 
The social value V (q), associated with the production of vector q, is the sum of two 
items. First, net consumer surplus {S (q) – R (q)} (gross consumer surplus minus 
revenue). Second, social value of tax savings for taxpayers generated by the sale of 
the goods, (1+) R (q) (where  is the shadow cost of public funds as Re 1 inflicts 
disutility of Re 1+ on taxpayers). That is, 
V(q)=S(q)+R(q)=S(q)+kpq                                                                  (4)  
The partial derivative of S with respect to q , p = )(
' qS , defines the demand 
function q(p), with cross elasticities RL  (qR /pL) (pL /qR) and own elasticity 
                                                       k  - (qk /pk) (pk /qk) 
The utilitarian social welfare function is the sum of consumer welfare and the PSP’s 
welfare. 
     W=[V (q)–(1+)(t+C(,e,q))]+U                                         (5) 
Substituting Eq. 2,  
     W=S(q) +R(q)–(1+)((e)+C(,e,q))-U                                 (6)  
That is W consists of three terms.  The social value V of outputs, the total cost  + C 
of operating the PSP times the shadow price of this cost, and the social cost U of 
leaving a rent to the PSP.  
 
Maximizing social welfare, W, w.r.t. to e, U and outputs kq  gives the first order 
conditions. First: 
            ’(e) = -Ce                                                                   (7) 
That is, the marginal disutility of effort is equated to marginal cost savings made by 
increasing effort. While the cost plus contract induces ’(e) = 0, the fixed price 
contract induces ’(e) = - Ce, and is therefore efficient. Under a fixed price contract 
t(C) = a – (C-C*) with a   (e*) and C* =  - e* the PSP as the residual claimant of 
its cost savings, would chose e to maximize (a - ( - e - C*) -  (e). The first order 
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condition, then gives e = e*, or optimal effort. Second, with utility U = 0, all rent is 
extracted
8
, but the participation constraint is satisfied.  
  
The third FOC is, 
kk qq
CV )1(                                                          (8) 
That is, each good is produced to the point where marginal generalized gross surplus 
is equated to marginal social cost of production. Doing the derivation with respect to 
qR, Eq. 8 becomes,  
   01 










 qRL
R
L
R
R
R
RR Cq
q
p
q
q
p
pp                              (8)' 
 
     or    LR =  RR                                                                   (9) 
 
where,     
R
qR
R
p
Cp
L R

                                                        (10) 
LR is good R’s Lerner index. 
     








 
k R
k
R
k
R
p
q
q
p
R


1
                                    (11) 
RR is good ’s Ramsey index. 
For independent demands 
     
R
RR

 1
1
                                                      (12) 
So that the price-marginal cost ratio is inversely proportional to the elasticity of 
demand for the good, subject to  the economy-wide cost of funds. Symmetric 
conditions can be derived for qL.  
 
If the maximization of social welfare is undertaken by adding a redistribution 
constraint D with shadow cost , Eq. 12 is changed to:  
                                                          
8
 In the class of linear contracts, t = a – bC, in general, da/db = C. If efficiency is uniform b = 1, under 
the fixed price contract, and the contract offered is t(C) = a - C. If efficiency varies, and there is 
asymmetric information, the most efficient PSP will prefer a fixed price contract where b = 1, since it is 
then the residual claimant for its cost savings. Other types will be intermediate to the cost plus contract 
which corresponds to b = 0. 
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Rq
R
R DR 



 1
1
                                          (12)' 
And for qL the Ramsey index now becomes: 
                                                     
Lq
L
L DR 



 1
1
 
Since redistribution to the poor raises social welfare, the price-cost margins on qR 
would now be relatively raised. 
 
From (9), (10), and (12)', for good R 
Rq
RR
qRR
D
P
CP





 1
1
 
and for good L 
Lq
LL
qLL
D
P
CP





 1
1
 
 
These two equations, if D is ignored and R > L 
      pR - CqR < pL - CqL                                                                                    (13) 
That is, if the demand elasticity of qR exceeds that of qL, then the margin of price over 
cost should be lower for qR compared to qL. The rich consume qR and the poor 
consume qL; therefore unlike our simplifying assumption if  is higher for qR, pR > pL 
is consistent with condition 13. Moreover, the re-distribution constraint D lowers the 
price cost margin on goods consumed by the poor and therefore the gap between the 
two price-cost margins shrinks.  
 
Maximizing welfare subject to an explicit constraint for budget balance across the 
activities of the PSP, 
      
k
LRkkk qqCqqp ),()(                                                    (14) 
endogenously generates  as the shadow price of the constraint, (14)9. If Eq. 14 holds 
with equality it implies budget balance or zero revenue deficits and a positive . A 
higher value of  would require higher price cost margins from equation 12. As long 
                                                          
9
 This was the way the equation 8 was first derived by Boiteux (1960), on the lines of Ramsey's earlier 
analysis of the optimal tax problem. Therefore the formulae (9) for optimal prices are known as 
 11 
as constraint (14) is met, the price cost margins have to be such that the budget is 
balanced. 
 
We assume the Government follows a populist pricing rule (PPR), which is,  
 
PPR: Hold pL constant and raise pR to cover costs. 
3 Results 
The framework derived gives interesting implications for the effect of cost shocks and 
their impact on incentives of the PSP managers. 
R1:  A positive cost shock leads to cross-subsidization  
If constraint 14 is met and then a positive cost shock occurs. If the PPR is followed so 
that the price of qL is held constant and pR is raised, given that R > L, Eq. 14 must be 
violated, because the fall in revenue from the sale of qL will not be compensated by 
the rise in qR. The PSP will begin running a deficit. A revenue deficit occurs and will 
have to be financed either by borrowing or printing money. Cross-subsidization is 
now occurring across the two goods, with proceeds from sale of qR subsidizing losses 
from the provision of qL. But if pR qR > C (qR), for some kinds of services
10
, conditions 
are ripe for the entry of private competitors, and the price structure may not be 
sustainable
11
, since further revenue losses occur as more customers of qR  are lost.  
R2: Fall in Incentives to invest 
Since the rise in pR is not sufficient to compensate for the constancy of pL, and the 
budget deficit rises, the PPR functions as a price cap. But it is a price cap that over-
extracts the rent, and leaves the PSP with a negative rent. The PSP's participation 
constraint (3) is violated. Its response is to cut back on investment, effort or the 
quality of its output. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ramsey formulas.  Boiteux had a more complete framework since he derived Hicksian compensated 
demand in a general equilibrium framework. 
10
 Faulhaber (1975) defines the absence of cross-subsidization as pR qR  C (qR) where C (q)  C (qL) + 
C (qR). That is, no one good by itself yields a profit to the PSP, when the cost of producing both goods 
together is less than that of producing any one alone. If this condition holds, then competitive entry in 
the production of any one of the goods would not occur, and the price structure would be sustainable. 
11
 Goyal (1999) outlines the problems that have arisen due to adverse incentives, in the provision of a 
number of public services. Examples of the adverse effects of cross subsidization are the widespread 
 12 
A price cap has better incentive properties compared to a cost of service or rate of 
return contract. Under a price cap the PSP is the residual claimant, there is an 
incentive to lower costs, so as to raise own share of returns. But if a falls below  
(e*), when prices are not changed after a cost shock that raises , the surplus of the 
PSP is negative, or U < 0. In the short-term optimal effort e*, will continue to be 
induced with the fixed price contract. But if there are limits to running a revenue 
deficit the only feasible ways to lower expenditure are to cut investment, lower effort 
or lower the quality of output. 
 
Investment, I, increases efficiency as it lowers costs, . Assume the PSP has an 
investment plan that would lower  in the next period. Since cost reimbursed now 
includes current and investment cost, the PSP will cover current costs, but choose an 
investment level less than the socially optimal. 
 
To see this let investment determine a probability distribution F(/I) for  [

 ,  ], 
with first order stochastic dominance that is,  FI   F/I >0 for   (

 ,  ). There are 
decreasing returns  to investment or FII <0. 
 
The optimal investment level I* minimizes the sum of investment cost and the ex post 
cost C = -e.  That is  
I* minimizes 






 


)/( IdFI 


  
After integrating by parts, the objective function becomes  
I* minimizes 






 




 dIFI )/(  
 The socially optimal effort level is given by ’ (e*)=1 and the socially optimum rent 
U() = 0 for all . 
 
If the government cannot observe I and it offers a cost reimbursement C  t (C + I), 
the PSP can now put in optimal effort e* reaching C*, but under invest, so that I < I*. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
use of private generators for electricity, the shifting of goods traffic from rail to road, and of 
 13 
The problem arises because costs are fungible
12
.  Alternatively both e < e* and I < I* 
may occur. Over time this will result in a high cost operation. Another way to evade a 
binding price cap is by an unverifiable cut in quality. 
R3: Fall in Incentives to maintain quality 
To see this, assume quality (x) and price (p) are close substitutes for both the 
consumer and the PSP.  The PSP then maximizes profits over p, x, with output given 
at q: 
   








 ),(
1
,},{ xpDxe
qp
xppDxp
MAX


 
Where the cost function C = ( - e  + x) q now increases with quality, and the quantity 
purchased increases with x and decreases with p according to the demand function D 
(p, x). 
 
If price increases (decreases) and quality decreases (increases) are perfect substitutes 
for both the consumer and the PSP, demand can be written as: 
)(
~
),( xpDxpD   
And since cost is now C = ( - e  + x) q the PSP can decrease quality to compensate 
for an administered price which is different from its optimal price. Indeed, if the good 
is free, although the price is zero, the quality will decrease until it equals the virtual 
monopoly price.  
 
To summarize, price controls in the presence of net positive cost shocks lead to 
systematic incentives to lower quality and investment in the public sector. This 
reduces the capacity of the state to tax, invest and provide services in the future. 
 
If this analysis applies to the Indian case, cost shocks must be causally prior and affect 
other macroeconomic time series. We test for this in the next section. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
international telephone calls to private providers.  
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4. Empirical Tests 
If the major causal factor for fiscal decay was a sustained pressure for transfers to 
interest groups, the ratio of government consumption to GDP would have gone up 
smoothly, raising the revenue deficit, money supply and inflation. But in India 
GC/GDP has been relatively constant but government interest payments rose steeply, 
as pricing policies after net positive cost shocks decreased revenues and forced it to 
borrow. The government began running revenue deficits, which cumulated over time. 
The causality therefore ran from cost shocks to the revenue deficit. This would 
explain why a steep fall in quality in the provision of Indian public services occurred 
after the oil shocks of the seventies. Therefore we test the following two hypotheses 
for the Indian economy. 
 
In the post 1970's: 
Hypothesis 1: Changes in revenue deficit raised money supply and caused inflation. 
Or 
Hypothesis 2: Net positive cost shocks proxied by inflation lead to proportionate 
changes in money supply and the revenue deficit. 
 
Rate of change of the following variables were used in the empirical exercise: 
a) Revenue deficit of central and state governments (denoted by revdefr). 
b) M3 component of money supply (denoted by m3r). 
c) The wholesale price index, WPI (denoted by infln). 
There are 25 observations
13
, from 1970-71 to 1994-95. Tables and graphs are 
presented in the appendix. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of Phillips-Perron
14
 unit root tests for each series. The null 
is the presence of unit roots, based upon the following regression: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12
 For example, Bajaj (1999) reports that in 1996-97, 52.46 percent of the provision made in the UP 
State Government for maintenance expenditures on the canal system was spent for payment of wages 
and salaries.   
13
 The data sources were the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), and the Economic and Political  
Weekly, Research Foundation (EPWRF) (1996). 
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Table 1 
ADF and Phillips Perron unit root tests 
 
Variable 
 
 
REVDEFR 
 
 
M3R 
 
 
INTR 
 
 
INFLN 
 
Phillips Perron test statistic 
Constant 
& 
No Trend 
 
12.002 * 
 
 
7.1516 * 
 
 
15.135 * 
 
 
6.14 * 
 
MacKinnon’s 5% critical value corresponding to the model of no trend is –2.99695. 
 
ttt yy   110               (15) 
MacKinnon’s critical values are used here at 5% level of significance. The results 
show that the null of unit root could not be accepted for any of these variables. The 
variables are stationary.  
 
We are interested in the structure of causality amongst these variables. In a systems 
estimation of Vector Autoregressions (VAR)
15
 each variable can be explained by the 
lagged values of every other variable including itself. Such estimations can therefore 
discover the direction of causality amongst variables, without imposing any such a 
priori restriction. We estimate the following general augmented VAR model: 


 
p
i
tttit uwztaaz
1
110
,        nt ,........2,1 .            (16) 
Where tz  is a 1m vector of jointly determined dependent variables and tw is a 1q  
vector of deterministic or exogenous variables like dummies etc. Now let 
 //2/1 , ttt zzz   where tz1 and tz2  are 11 n  and 12 n  subsets of tz , and 21 nnm  .  
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 The Phillips-Perron method is suited to the short span of data as it uses a non-parametric correction 
for serial correlation, as an alternative to the inclusion of lag terms. We consider the growth rates of the 
variables, and take the model with constant and no trends.  
15
 Since our variables are I(0) or stationary, we estimate a VAR. Toda and Phillips (1993) recommend 
the estimation of a co-integration VAR to conduct statistical inference including causality testing when 
variables are non stationary and integrated of order I(1). Tests methodologically similar to ours have 
been conducted by Nakajima, 1995, and Obben, 1996. 
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Consider the following block decomposition of (16): 
 
 
 
p
i
tt
p
i
itiitit uwzztaaz
1
11
1
,212,,111,11101
 
 
 
 
p
i
tt
p
i
itiitit uwzztaaz
1
22
1
,222,,121,21202
 
The hypothesis that the subset tz2 do not ‘Granger-cause’ tz1 is defined by the 
following pnn 21  restrictions: 
0: 12 GH  
Where  12,12,312,212,112 ,......,, p . The log-likelihood ratio statistic for the 
test of these restrictions is computed as: 
 








 
~~
12 loglog20 RGLR  
Where 
~
is the ML estimator of variance covariance matrix for the unrestricted 
system (16) and 
~
R  is the ML estimator of the variance covariance matrix when the 
restrictions 012   are imposed. Under the null hypothesis, that 012  , GLR  is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared variable with pnn 21  degrees of freedom. 
 
The direction of causality among these variables is examined in three steps. First we 
estimate a VAR. The OLS estimates of single equations in the unrestricted VAR 
provide prima facie evidence on the possible direction of causality. Second, block-
Granger causality tests provide evidence on the ability or inability of the past values 
of a single or group of variables to predict the other variables. Third, impulse 
response
16
 functions show the future dynamic responses of the system to shocks in 
specific variables. 
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 Unlike the orthogonalized impulse response function advanced by Sims (1980, 1981) our diagrams 
depict the generalized impulse response functions as proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and 
Shin (1997). The orthogonalized impulse response is not unique and in general depends upon the 
particular ordering of the variables in the VAR, if the covariance matrix of the shocks is not diagonal. 
The generalized impulse response function circumvents the problem of the dependence of the 
orthogonalized impulse responses on the ordering of the VAR. 
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We estimate a model of unrestricted VAR of order 1
17
 with a constant, a trend and 
dummies for two fiscal years, to take care of outliers. They assume a value 1 for 
1973-74 and 1983-84 and zero elsewhere. The oil shock of 1973, and severe droughts 
of 1972 and 1974 led to high inflation. The month to month average WPI shows that, 
inflation was at its highest between mid 1973 and September 1974, at 33%. In 1983-
84 also there was a sharp increase in agricultural prices.  
 
TABLE 2 
OLS estimation result of single equations in the Unrestricted VAR 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Diagnostics Tests 
 
Serial 
Correlation1 
 
Functional 
Form 2 
 
 
Normality3 
 
Heteroscedasticity 4 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
revdefr(
-1) 
 
m3(-1) 
 
Infln(-1) 
 
const 
 
trend 
 
2
R  
 
LM  
 12
 
 
F 
F(1, 14) 
 
LM 
 12  
 
F 
F(1, 14) 
 
LM 
 22  
 
 
LM 
 12  
 
F 
F(1, 20) 
 
Revdefr 
 
 
m3r 
 
 
infln 
 
0.34546 
(6.8269)
* 
 
0.0012 
(0.484) 
 
-0.009 
(-1.573) 
 
3.6155(.
8686) 
 
-.1834 
(-0.85) 
 
0.7116 
(1.493) 
 
 
-10.2965 
(-5.095)* 
 
-0.314 
(-3.03)* 
 
0.328 
(1.423) 
 
-0.19 
(-.22) 
 
0.235 
(5.1)* 
 
-0.06 
(-0.6) 
 
0.092 
(5.4)* 
 
0.000 
(0.30) 
 
0.000 
(0.05) 
 
0.960 
 
 
0.366 
 
 
0.309 
 (1.47) 
 
 
(1.23) 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(1.00) 
 
 
(0.83) 
 
 
(.006) 
 (6.69)* 
 
 
(.099) 
 
 
(1.304) 
 
(6.12)* 
 
 
(0.063) 
 
 
(0.882) 
  
(0.348) 
 
 
(0.603) 
 
 
(0.5729) 
 
 
(0.874) 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
 
(.0428) 
 
(0.828) 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
 
(.039) 
 
1
 Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation. 
2
 Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the 
fitted values.  
3
 Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals. 
4
 Based on the regression of squared residuals 
on squared fitted values. Tests are based on LM  
and F versions. 
*Significant at less than 5% level. The dummies dum745 and dum834 were significant only for the 
equation of revdefr 
 
 
Table 2 gives the OLS estimate of single equations in the unrestricted VAR. Figures 
within bracket under the independent variables are t-ratios for the respective 
coefficients, and those under diagnostic tests are the respective test statistics
18
. 
 
Observation 1: In the OLS estimate of single equations in the unrestricted VAR: 
a. Past values of infln significantly explain revdefr and m3r.  
b. revdefr is explained by its own past value beside the past value of infln. 
c. Past values of neither revdefr nor m3r could significantly explain infln. 
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 VAR of order 2 was estimated with a constant and trend but without the dummies. VAR of order 1 
was selected based upon the AIC criterion.  
18
Details of these test statistics are given at the base of the table. 
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Source: Table 2. 
 
Neither m3r nor revdefr can explain any of the other variables though infln explains 
both these variables in these single equation estimations. Failure of the past values of 
m3r to explain any other variable including itself and the inability of revdefr to 
explain any other variable except itself, though they both are being significantly 
explained by past values of infln, points to the possibility of them being non-causal in 
this systems estimation. This provides initial evidence that cost shocks proxied by 
infln are the exogenous variables causing or explaining the other two variables. 
 
Table3 
LR Test of Deletion of Deterministic/Exogenous 
Variables in the VAR 
 
Variables 
 
 
L R  test of  variable deletion 
 
const 
 
 
 32 =  23.6746* 
 
tt 
 
 
 32  =  31.7553* 
 
dum745 
 
 
 32  =  85.7070* 
 
dum834 
 
 
 32  =  58.1756 
*Significance at less than 5% level. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Block Granger Non-Causality in the VAR 
 
Variables 
 
 
L R Test of block non-
causality. 
 
revdefr 
 
 
 22  =   3.6119 
 
m3r 
 
 22  =   3.0729 
 
 
Infln 
 
 22  =  26.5874* 
 
 
revdefr & m3 
 
 
 22  =  7.3549* 
*Significance at less than 5% level. 
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Table 4 provides the result of tests on block non-causality of variables
19
. The 
associated statistic is used for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
lagged values of a variable or a group of variables in the block of equations explaining 
the remaining variables are zero.  
 
Observation 2: Tests on block non-causality of variables show that:  
a. The inability of past values of either revdefr or m3r to predict the remaining two 
variables could not be rejected. 
The joint non-causality of revdefr and m3r in explaining infln could not be accepted.  
Source: Table 4. 
 
Observation 2 shows cost shocks, proxied by infln, to be the basic driving force, 
causing and hence explaining revdefr and m3r. These results support hypothesis 2. 
Net positive cost shocks, manifest in inflation, explain proportionate changes in 
money supply and revenue deficit. 
 
Impulse response functions provide further evidence on causality. These functions 
measure time profiles of the effect of present shocks on the future states of a dynamic 
system.  
 
Observation 3: Impulse response profiles support the direction of causality from infln 
and m3r to revdefr and not the other way round. 
Source: In Figure 1, corresponding to the model without interest payments, a one 
standard error shock to the equation for revdefr does not affect the time profile of any 
other variable. However, a one standard error shock to equation for either m3r or infln 
does have an effect on the future time profile of revdefr.  
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 Before proceeding further with Granger non-causality tests, we check for the significance of the 
dummies, intercept and trend component in this systems estimation. Table 3 provides the result of these 
tests. Likelihood ratio test of exogenous variable deletion shows that none of them should be deleted 
from this estimation. Significance of the dummies shows the importance of shocks (for those particular 
years) to the Indian economy. 
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Impulses Responses in the model with revdefr, m3r & infln 
Generalised impulse responses to revdefr
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Inability of shocks in revdefr to initiate changes in m3r provides suggestive evidence 
that automatic monetization of the revenue deficit was absent over the period of our 
analysis. The Indian central bank was not independent of the Government in this 
period, but in a poor populous democracy without widespread automatic indexation of 
wages, keeping inflation low is a major political objective. The Reserve Bank of India 
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used special deposit and reserve requirement schemes, to partially neutralize the 
impact of monetization of government deficits.  
 
Next we introduce another variable, the rate of change in interest payments on public 
debt (denoted as intr), as an additional proxy to capture costs. In periods of cost 
shocks, the Government borrows to meet increased expenditure and this cumulates as 
interest payments on debt. We again estimate a VAR of order 1
20
 with constant, trend 
and dummies for two more fiscal years 1972-73 and 1981-82 to take care of the 
outliers (shocks) in the observations for intr. Real value of interest payments is 
affected by the rate of inflation. The shooting up of inflation from 5.6% in 1971-72 to 
10% in 1972-73 lowered the burden of government interest payments as nominal 
interest rates were administered. Similarly the sharp fall in overall inflation from 18% 
in 1980-81 to 9% in 1981-82 had an adverse impact on government interest payments. 
The dummies of 1972-73 and 1981-82 capture these shocks.  
 
TABLE 5 
1
 Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation. 
2
 Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the 
fitted values.  
3
 Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals. 
4
 Based on the regression of squared residuals 
on squared fitted values. Tests are based on LM and F versions. 
*Significant at less than or equal to 5% level. **Significant at 5.7% level. 
For the revdefr equation, all the dummies except dum812 are significant. In the equations of m3r and 
infln, none of the dummies are significant. In the intr equation, only dum745 is significant.   
 
Table 5 provides the result on OLS estimation of single equations in the unrestricted 
VAR. It strengthens our previous finding in support of hypothesis 2. The lagged 
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 This was again based upon the AIC criterion as before. 
         
Serial 
Correlation1 
 
Functional 
Form 2 
 
 
Normality3 
 
Heteroscedasticity 4 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
revdef(-1) 
 
m3(-1) 
 
Infln(-1) 
 
intr 
 
const 
 
trend 
 
2R  
 
LM  
 12
 
 
F 
F(1, 14) 
 
LM 
 12
 
 
F 
F(1, 11) 
 
LM 
 22
 
 
LM 
 12  
 
F 
F(1, 20) 
 
revdefr 
 
 
m3r 
 
 
infln 
 
 
intr 
 
 
 
 
0.2651 
(6.5466)* 
 
0.00073 
(-0.24527) 
 
-0.00667 
(-1.1109) 
 
-0.0086 
(-0.8019) 
 
-0.7415 
(-0.245) 
 
-0.1503 
(-0.673) 
 
0.65175 
(1.4560) 
 
-0.3389 
(-0.422) 
 
-9.017 
(-3.596)* 
 
-0.43674 
(-2.355)* 
 
0.49852 
(1.3399) 
 
1.4544 
(2.182)* 
 
-1.1731 
(-1.243) 
 
-0.0982 
(-1.408) 
 
0.10966 
(0.7833) 
 
0.0979 
(0.3906) 
 
-0.087 
(-0.12) 
 
0.2599 
(5.09)* 
 
-0.115 
(-1.13) 
 
0.2947 
(1.608) 
 
0.0715 
(4.704)* 
 
0.0006 
(0.5388) 
 
0.00124 
(0.552) 
 
-0.0064 
(-1.598) 
 
0.9809 
 
 
0.3616 
 
 
0.4328 
 
 
0.6995 
 
(0.5987) 
 
 
(1.3884) 
 
 
(0.0022) 
 
 
(1.894) 
 
(0.3077) 
 
 
(0.7409) 
 
 
(0.0011) 
 
 
(1.0363) 
 
(2.152) 
 
 
(0.387) 
 
 
(0.509) 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
(1.1932) 
 
 
(0.1969) 
 
 
(0.2609) 
 
 
(0.0283) 
 
(2.5666) 
 
 
(0.42756) 
 
 
(5.743)** 
 
 
(1.5911) 
 
(0.9482) 
 
 
(1.3756) 
 
 
(0.4162) 
 
 
(0.1018) 
 
(0.9008) 
 
 
(1.3339) 
 
 
(0.3857) 
 
 
(0.0930) 
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values of neither m3r nor intr can significantly predict any of the other variables 
including themselves. Though the past value of revdef is instrumental in explaining its 
present value, it fails to explain the present value of any other variable. Infln is not 
explained by lagged values of any other variable except itself, though its lagged value 
is significant in explaining the other variables considered in the VAR. This again 
indicates that infln is the major driving force (causal variable) in this system of 
variables. Values of adjusted 
2
R show revdefr to be the variable best explained, 
followed by intr. This implies that they are the explained variables in this systems 
estimation.  
 
Table6 
       LR Test of Deletion of Deterministic/Exogenous  
Variables in the VAR 
 
Variables 
 
 
L R  test of  variable deletion 
 
const 
 
 
 42 = 28.334* 
 
tt 
 
 
 42 = 42.205* 
 
dum723 
 
 
 42 = 11.7998* 
 
dum745 
 
 42 = 94.726* 
 
 
Dum812 
 42 = 14.0411* 
 
 
dum834 
 42 = 84.266* 
 
*Significance at less than 5% level. 
 
 
 
The likelihood ratio test for deletion of exogenous variables presented in Table 6 
further shows that none of the exogenous variables could be deleted from this four 
variable equation system.  
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Table 7 
Block Granger Non-Causality in the VAR 
 
Variables 
 
 
L R Test of block 
non-causality. 
 
revdefr 
 
 
 32  = 3.5532 
 
m3r 
 
 
 32  = 4.9978 
 
Infln 
 
 32  = 34.4027* 
 
intr 
 
 32  = 9.7432* 
 
revdefr & m3r 
 
 
 42  = 7.2349 
*Significant at less than 5% level. 
 
 
Results on block non-causality tests presented in Table 7 maintain the inability of 
lagged values of revdefr and m3r individually as well as jointly to explain the other 
variables. However, past values of intr and infln affect the rest of the variables in the 
systems estimation. This causal relationship is found to be significant. This again 
supports hypothesis 2 that past values of intr and infln explain revdef and m3r.  
 
The generalized impulse response functions of Figure 2 provide further support for 
hypothesis 2. A one standard error shock to revdefr does not affect rest of the 
variables to the extent it affects its own future values. However, shocks in the rest of 
the variables i.e., intr, infln and m3r have a much larger impact on revdefr. These 
results can be summed up as follows:  
 
Observation 4: Repeating the tests using the rate of change in interest payments on 
public debt (denoted as intr), as an additional proxy to capture costs, again supports 
hypothesis 2. 
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Impulses Responses in the model with revdefr, m3r, infln & intr 
Generalised impulse responses to revdefr
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In order to derive the direction of causality amongst cost shocks, proportionate 
changes in money supply and revenue deficit we probed into three aspects of a 
systems estimation of VAR. The single equation OLS estimates of unrestricted VAR 
provides us with a prima facie evidence of causality amongst variables considered in 
our analysis. Block-granger causality showed whether lagged values of a variable or a 
group of variables were able to predict the others. The impulse response function 
measured the time profile of present shocks to a variable on the future states of the 
dynamic system.  
 25 
 
The single equation estimates show that past values of infln is able to significantly 
explain rest of the variables included in our analysis though it remains unexplained by 
all others including its own past value. Block Granger non-causality in the form of 
inability of past values of m3r and revdefr to predict other variables in the systems 
estimation both individually and taken together and when we include proportionate 
changes in interest payments is also observed. Such non-causality is however ruled 
out for the variable infln and intr. The impulse response functions however show that 
a current disturbance in any of the variables has a large impact on the future time 
profile of revdefr. All our tests provide suggestive evidence that cost shocks, with 
proportionate changes in interest payments and inflation as proxies, lead to 
proportionate changes in money supply and revenue deficit. Thus hypothesis 2 cannot 
be falsified for the Indian economy.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The general theory of cross-subsidization and incentives offers a useful framework to 
analyze aggregate government finances. It suggests a shift from emphasis on vested 
interests as responsible for fiscal decay, to the incentive structure set in place by the 
populist response to exogenous shocks. In the long run no group benefits from the 
policy. Maximizing short-run chances of re-election can explain why such incentive 
structures are adopted, and strategic aspects, or relative group positions, why they 
persist--this provides scope for future work. The analysis can be applied to analyze 
deterioration in the quality of developing economy public goods defined more 
broadly, for example to include the environment. Or narrowed down to focus on a 
specific public good. If asymmetric information, which has varying impact on 
different government services, is explicitly modeled, it can explain why some types of 
services show greater deterioration. 
  
The analysis is illustrated and tested with the Indian case. In the face of the cost 
shocks of the seventies, and the social objective to protect the poor, the government 
functioned with low price caps for much of the products and services it provided. But 
where it had monopoly power and was servicing the rich, prices were raised much 
above costs of production. There was extensive cross-subsidization. The same 
principles were applied to tax collection. Large groups of people were exempt from 
 26 
income tax, for reasons of equity or cost of collection, and rates were raised steeply 
for the rest. Consequently the tax base is very low; moreover evasion became 
pervasive. The government's ability to collect taxes fell. As the rich found 
alternatives, the cross-subsidization was not sufficient to cover costs. General 
revenues did not even cover consumption. Budgetary support was insufficient to 
prevent the deterioration in quality, and fall in investment, that came with the price 
caps. Poor quality was an implicit price rise that lowered consumption demand; fall in 
investment harmed the provision of future services. These services or public goods 
included infrastructure, education, health, social capital and even the environment. 
The fiscal decay also encouraged corruption. 
 
Causality analysis based on a VAR model supports the causal priority of cost shocks 
compared to pressure by interest groups, as the source of fiscal decay. The policy 
implications following from the analysis are that if the government lowers the revenue 
deficit by raising user charges and the tax base, investment in and the quality of 
provision of essential public services can improve. Privatization, used as a means of 
re-allocating public capital in more efficient directions, is another means of improving 
finances.  
 
As the long-term welfare losses of short-term populism become obvious, the perverse 
incentives are understood, and non-distorting mechanisms adopted to protect the very 
poor in transition, the reform will be acceptable to a wide spectrum of interest groups. 
This will make it more feasible for the Government to restructure, privatize in some 
areas, improve the quality and quantity of other essential services, thus facilitating the 
development of human capital and human dignity.   
 
References 
Alesina, A. and A. Drazen, 1991, "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?" American 
Economic Review, 81, 5, 1170-88. 
 
Bajaj, J.L., 1999, "Impact of Pay Revision on State Governments' Finances", 
Economic and Political Weekly, 43, 22, 1341-1351. 
 
Bardhan, P., 1984, The Political Economy of Development in India, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Boiteux, M., 1960, "Peak Load Pricing," Journal of Business, 33, 157-179.  
 27 
 
Central Statistical Organisation, National Accounts Statistics, Various issues. 
 
Dixit, A.K, 1996, The Making of Economic Policy: a Transactions-cost Politics 
Perspective, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Drazen, A., 1996, "The Political Economy of Delayed Reform," Journal of Policy 
Reform, 1, 1, 25-46. 
 
EPW Research Foundation, 1996, National Accounts Statistics of India, 1950-51 to 
1994-95, Bombay: EPW Research Foundation. 
 
Faulhaber, G., 1975, "Cross subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises", American 
Economic Review, 65, 966-977. 
 
Goyal, A., 1999, "The Political Economy of the Revenue Deficit", in India Development 
Report, ed. by Kirit S. Parikh, IGIDR and Oxford University Press. 
 
Joskow, P., 1998, “Regulatory Priorities for Reforming Infrastructure Sectors in 
Developing Countries”, paper presented at Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics, Washington: World Bank. 
 
Koop, G., M.H. Peseran, and S.M. Potter 1996, “Impulse Response Analysis in 
Nonlinear Multivariate Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 74, 119-147. 
 
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole, 1993, “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and 
Regulation”, Cambridge: MIT Press 
 
Nakajima, K., 1995, "Block Causality Tests of Taiwan's Trade Structure and 
Economic Growth", Economic Review 46(2), 125-35. 
  
Obben, J., 1996, "Dynamic Relationships among GDP, Government Revenue 
and Expenditure in Brunei: A Vector Autoregressive Model," Singapore 
Economic Review, 41(2), 67-86. 
 
Peseran, M.H. and Y.Shin 1997, “Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in Linear 
Multivariate Models”, unpublished manuscript, Cambridge University. 
 
Rodrick, Dani, 1996, "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of 
Economic Literature, 34, 1, 9-41. 
 
Sims, C, 1980, “Macroeconomics and Reality”, Econometrica, 48, 1-48. 
 
Sims, C, 1981, “An Autoregressive Index Model for the US 1948-1975’, Large-Scale 
Econometric Models, ed. J.B. Ramsey, North-Holland, The Netherlands. 
 
Toda, H.Y. and Phillips, P.C.B., 1993, "Vector Autoregressions and Causality", 
Econometrica, 61, 6, 1367-1393. 
 
